100 U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS CAN MELT DOWN FROM DESIGN FLAW AND THE NRC IS DOING NOTHING

FOURTEEN, 14, "UNUSUAL EVENTS" HAVE OCCURRED AT AMERICA'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS FROM 2001 TO DECEMBER, 2015, THAT COULD HAVE CAUSED A MELTDOWN OF NUCLEAR REACTORS AND A MIND-BOGGLING DISASTER FOR ALL WITHIN RANGE OF FALLOUT FROM SUCH A MELTDOWN.

IN ALL 14 INSTANCES, THE CULPRIT WAS A KNOWN DESIGN FLAW IN THE 'SINGLE PHASE' LINE OF THE ELECTRICAL SUPPLY, A FLAW ALL OUR NUKE PLANTS EXCEPT ONE ARE KNOWN TO HAVE.
WHEN SEVEN NUCLEAR ENGINEERS WHO ALL WORK FOR THE NRC BROUGHT THIS TO LIGHT, ASKED FOR ALL OF AMERICA'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS TO BE FORCED TO IMMEDIATELY CHECK FOR THIS KNOWN PROBLEM, THE NRC REJECTED THEIR REQUEST... AND HAS CONTINUED TO IGNORE THIS FLAW FOR OVER 4 YEARS NOW!

After 3 years of trying to get the NRC to act on this and meeting a brick wall, in July, 2015, the group of engineers submitted a 'draft order' to force power plants to look at this most serious known issue, only to have it REJECTED BY THE NRC's LEGAL DEPARTMENT as a violation of the “backfit rule.”

That rule is a controversial measure adopted around 2000 which precludes new regulations which require power plant operators to make costly fixes to existing systems unless it is needed for a major safety reason.

The electrical group submitted a second draft and it, too, was rejected as a violation of the backfit rule. 

Rather than revise the rule a third time, the group chose to bypass the legal department and file a 2.206 petition, a specific process allowing citizens and civic groups to push for a rule making decision. 

The filing was unusual in that the group chose to file as civilians, rather than attempt other in-house means of getting the agency to order the industry to upgrade the suspect electrical systems.

THESE SEVEN MEN HAVE BEEN FIGHTING TO CORRECT THIS ISSUE AND SAFEGUARD OUR NUKE FACILITIES FOR ALL OF US SINCE 2012.

IN FEBRUARY, 2013, 3 YEARS AGO, ACTING CHIEF MATHEW OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION (ONRR) , SUBMITTED A REPORT THAT DESCRIBED, IN DEPTH, TWO SEPARATE "UNUSUAL EVENTS" AT THE BYRON  STATION NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IN ILLINOIS, IN WHICH A "SINGLE PHASE" CONDITION CAUSED COOLING FAILURE.

BOTH THOSE EVENTS, AS WELL AS SIMILAR EVENTS AT OTHER NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED IN 2011 AND 2012, BUT NOTHING WAS DONE TO PREVENT THE SAME FROM HAPPENING AGAIN AND AGAIN.

THE NRC DID NOT STEP IN AND FORCE LICENSEES TO PERFORM THE IN-DEPTH, DETAILED SAFETY CHECKS THE ONRR HAD STATED WERE CRUCIAL FOR SAFE OPERATIONS OF ALL U.S. REACTORS.
THE LICENSEES DID NOT VOLUNTARILY DO SO.
AND THEN, THE SEVEN NRC ENGINEERS GOT SICK OF WAITING FOR COMPLIANCE FROM THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND HAVE NOW FILED A PETITION TO MAKE THE NRC "REGULATE" AND "PROTECT".

BELOW THE MARCH 5 ARTICLE, I HAVE COPIED THE HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE PDF FROM FEBRUARY, 2013.
ONE CAN SEE THE SINCERITY OF THE CONCERN BY THE STAFF OF THE ONRR IN THE STATEMENTS MADE BACK THEN.


AFTER FOUR LONG YEARS

From the Yonkers Tribune, March 5, 2016

"After four years of increasingly tense internal discussion, seven Nuclear Regulatory Commission engineers have formally petitioned the governing Commissioners to either order the nation’s nuclear power plant to immediately correct a design flaw governing their reactor cooling systems or order them all to shut down.
The flaw is in the original design of the electrical system, and has escaped notice for decades. According to the engineers’ petition, as well as a series of staff analyses on file at the NRC, the design flaw occurs in what is called an “single phase” condition in which little or no electricity is entering the plant to operate its backup cooling systems in the event of a blackout or other event cutting off power from the grid. The result is that the motors of backup generators are underpowered and this can cause their motors to burn out. When that happens, there is no way to keep the reactor core cool.
The seven members of the Electrical Engineering Branch in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, led by Acting Chief Roy K. Mathew, stated in the petition that “the staff determined that all nuclear facilities are susceptible to this design vulnerability except one plant, and recommended that the NRC take prompt regulatory action.”

As a result, the petition states, if the plants are not ordered to immediately redesign their electrical systems then the Commissioners should “issue Orders to immediately shutdown the operating nuclear power plants since the licensees are operating their facilities without addressing the significant design deficiency…and with inoperable electric power systems….”

FROM THE 2013 PDF:

FIRST EVENT, JANUARY 30, 2012 IN UNIT 2 OF THE BYRON FACILITY:
[EMPHASIS IS MINE.]

"The open circuit created an unbalanced voltage condition on the two 6.9-kV nonsafety-related RCP buses and the two 4.16-kV ESF buses. 

ESF loads remained energized momentarily, relying on equipment protective devices to

prevent damage from an unbalanced overcurrent condition.
The overload condition caused several ESF loads to trip...

The licensee reviewed the event and identified design vulnerabilities in the protection scheme for the 4.16-kV ESF buses.

A second event also occurred at Byron Station Unit 1 on February 28, 2012. 
This event was ALSO initiated by a failed inverted porcelain insulator.

In this event, the 4.16-kV ESF buses did sense fault condition and separated SATs from the 4.16-kV buses.
The 1A and 1B DGs started and energized the 4.16-kV ESF buses as designed.

SAME PROBLEM IDENTIFIED AT OTHER FACILITIES

Past operating experience has identified design vulnerabilities associated with single-phase open circuit conditions at Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 (BVPS1), James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant, and Nine Mile Point, Unit 1 (NMP1).

These events involved offsite power supply circuits that an open-circuited phase rendered inoperable. 

In each instance, the condition went UNDETECTED FOR SEVERAL WEEKS because offsite power was not aligned during normal operation and the surveillance procedures, which recorded phase-to phase voltage, did NOT identify the loss of the single phase. 

For more information on the events at BVPS1, JAF, and NMP1, see NRC Information Notice 2012-03, “Design Vulnerability in Electric Power

System,” dated March 1, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML120480170).

DENIAL, DENIAL, DENIAL BY THE POWER PLANT OPERATORS.
THEY SAY IT IS NOT A CONCERN!

The licensees stated that detection of a single-phase open circuit condition is beyond the approved design and licensing basis of the plant.

Most licensees responded that a high impedance fault by itself (independent of the open-phase circuit condition) is not a concern, not credible, or the existing protection is adequate.

[A MILLION AND ONE EXCUSES NOT TO BOTHER TO EVEN CHECK THEIR SYSTEMS!]

Although the Byron initiating event (single-phase open circuit at the high-voltage

connection to the SAT with high impedance ground fault condition) can occur at all operating plants, one licensee stated that this is not a credible event at its facility because of the unique design of the switchyard (each circuit is routed in metal-enclosed, Sulphur Hexafluoride (SF6) gas-insulated bus).

ACTING CHIEF/STAFF DISAGREE WITH LICENSEES

The staff’s review of the licensees’ responses concluded that most of the licensees did NOT perform DETAILED analysis to validate the plant-specific capability to detect and AUTOMATICALLY respond to a single-phase open circuit condition with and without high impedance ground fault condition on the required offsite power circuits.

The staff recognizes that the current plant licensing bases documents have NOT specifically identified this design vulnerability discussed in BL 2012-01. 

The NRC had NOT specifically required licensees to address this design vulnerability at the time of licensing or through subsequent generic communications because this design vulnerability and the safety significance was NOT KNOWN TO THE STAFF until the Byron Unit 2 event occurred which led to a scenario where neither the offsite power system nor the onsite power system was able to perform its intended safety functions. 

However, the regulatory requirements discussed above existed at the time of licensing these plants; therefore, NRC may have to take regulatory actions to address this design vulnerability.

FOUR RECOMMENDATIONS WERE MADE BY THE 'STAFF':

1- For current operating plants, the staff recommends the NRC take further regulatory

actions to require licensees to provide design features to detect and automatically respond to a single-phase open circuit or high impedance fault condition on the high voltage side of a credited offsite circuit.

2- For the four new reactors with COLs, the staff recommends the NRC take further regulatory actions to require licensees to provide design features to detect and respond to a single-phase open circuit with or without high impedance fault condition on the high-voltage side of a credited offsite circuit prior to the fuel load.

3- All licensees should have operating procedures and surveillances to monitor the availability and operability of offsite power supplies (all three phases) at the ESF buses, AT LEAST ONCE EVERY SHIFT during normal plant operation BASED ON THE DESIGN VULNERABILITY identified in the Bulletin.

4- All licensees should implement corrective actions in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI “Corrective Actions,” to ensure that the onsite and the offsite electric power systems can perform its intended safety functions BASED ON THE DESIGN VULNERABILITY identified in this Bulletin.

"Based on its review, the staff recommends additional regulatory actions."

THERE WERE NO FURTHER "ADDITIONAL REGULATORY ACTIONS" TAKEN BY THE NRC.... NO REGULATION, NO PROTECTION OF MILLIONS OF U.S. CITIZENS....AGAIN.

THE DAMNABLE NRC KISSES THE NUCLEAR ENERGY INDUSTRY'S BEHIND SO MANY TIMES A DAY THAT ALL THE "LICENSEES" SHOULD HAVE CHAPPED CHEEKS.

HAS THE NRC EVEN PUBLICLY INFORMED AMERICAN CITIZENS OF THIS VERY REAL HAZARD, THIS THREAT TO ALL BUT PERHAPS ONE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IN THE USA?

NO!
AS ALWAYS, NO THE NRC IS NOT ABOUT TO BLOW THE WHISTLE ON ITS DARLINGS!
THE NRC WILL LIKELY NEVER, NEVER DO MUCH OF ANYTHING OR REVEAL MUCH OF ANYTHING THAT MIGHT SHOW ALL THE WORLD JUST HOW DANGEROUS, HOW SUDDENLY VERY DANGEROUS, NUCLEAR ENERGY CAN BECOME.

DIDN'T THE DESIGN ENGINEERS WHO CREATED THE ORIGINAL FAILING SYSTEM REALIZE THE FLAW? 

WOULD THEY HAVE ADMITTED IT IF THEY DID KNOW?

IT WAS PURELY "ACCIDENTAL" THAT THIS WAS DISCOVERED BY MEN WHO DO CARE WHAT HAPPENS TO THE AMERICAN POPULATION.

"At the time, it was thought that the shutdowns resulted from a string of unfortunate coincidences.
But further examination by the NRC’s electrical engineering branch found something more alarming.

THE FLAW EXPLAINED
Alternating current comes out in three currents, or phases, which are positive, negative, and neutral. 
At the high voltage levels coming directly from the power plant, the currents are on SEPARATE lines, labeled A, B, and C.
 
David Lochbaum, nuclear safety expert with the Union of Concerned Scientists, explained that “the output from A and B are constantly monitored to make sure they are together, or in phase.

“There are circuit breakers and sensors within the system noting if there is a fault and the two are not in phase. When that happens, a circuit breaker opens to block that line and reroute the electricity. The grid operates on the same principal, with circuit breakers isolating lines when there are interruptions so the entire northeast doesn’t have a blackout.

“Within the plant there are electrical breakers signaled to open to isolate the problem and others will close for the systems around it.

At Byron that didn’t happen.
And they didn’t monitor the phase that failed.”

[THEY DID NOT MONITOR IT?
WHY NOT?
ISN'T THAT PROTOCOL, TO MONITOR EVERYTHING?
OBVIOUSLY NOT!]
At Byron, however, the single phase, Line C, was not monitored and, in fact, had broken and fallen to the ground between the plant’s main transformer and the nearby power substation. Unfortunately, the staff analysis stated, the line on the ground “did not result in a detectable ground fault” since single phases were not monitored.

Because of this power shortage, none of the plant’s four reactor coolant pumps were operable.
Officials from Exelon, which owns and operates Byron and 10 other nuclear power plants, as well as inspectors from the NRC initially thought that the shutdown was the result of a series of unfortunate coincidences. 

But On Feb. 28, 2012, there was a similar interrupted and undetected phase which caused a shutdown at Byron’s Unit 1. And, as in the earlier event, it disabled the plant’s cooling systems. 
That caused Mathews and the electric unit he led to investigate further and see if there had been any other shutdowns in which an undetected phase disruption disabled the cooling pumps. 

Their initial look found identical shutdowns at the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 in Pennsylvania in November, 2007; and in New York, the James Fitzpatrick and the neighboring Nine Mile plants, which share a power substation, shut down in December, 2005.

The staff analysis concluded that the design of the electrical systems was “inadequate because it did not consider the possibility of the loss of a single phase… 

This situation resulted in neither the onsite nor the offsite electric power system being able to perform its intended safety functions” to provide electric power to the plant’s safety systems. 
Plants are required to have two separate sets of electrical power lines and monitors for their core cooling systems so that operators can still control the reactor even if one line is damaged by fire or another event.

The loss of a single phase of alternating current, the NRC staff found, “can potentially damage both trains of the emergency core cooling system.” 

In that case, there is nothing to prevent a meltdown.

In a practical sense, said Lochbaum, who assisted the NRC in updating their operator training manuals, the situation facing Byron resembled a brownout, in which only a small amount of electricity is getting through to the equipment.

 “The problem at Byron was that all the electrical equipment could not get enough electricity to operate effectively.
“The larger motors on the cooling pumps need a lot of current.
 If they aren’t getting the flow they need they can sit there and try to run, and basically their motors will burn up.”


In July 2012, the Mathews group sent out an urgent notice to all plant operators requesting that they check their electrical systems to see if they were capable of detecting problems in a single phase. 

They were ordered to complete their findings within 90 days.

The responses from all but one of the nation’s 100 nuclear plant operators were similar to the October 25, 2012 response from New York’s twin Indian Point nuclear power plants: “The relay systems were not specifically designed to detect an open single phase of a three phase system. Detection of a single-open phase condition is beyond the approved design and licensing basis of the plant.”

THEY SIMPLY REFUSED, BASED ON THEIR ORIGINAL LICENSING!

The lone outlier, which was not identified, had modified the plant’s electrical system for other reasons. But in the process, their system was immune from the defect present in all the other nuclear power plants.
Not only does this situation affect the 99 operating reactors, it also applies to the four AP1000 plants under construction at the Vogtle Plant in Georgia and the Sumner plant in South Carolina.

That is because these plants are a new design, and while their safety systems appeared sound on paper and in simulations, they do not work as planned when actually built and require design modifications to meet actual operational needs. 

As a result, a Feb. 26, 2013 staff analysis found that the electrical systems are incomplete and ARE STILL BEING DESIGNED (WITH THE FLAW INTACT!].
“In addition,” the staff assessment concluded, “the generic AP1000 plant operating procedures are under development and the licensees’ review of the generic procedures did not identify specific operator actions related to phase voltage verifications of the THREE phases.”

As a result, the electrical group concluded, ALL OF THE NATION'S NUCLEAR PLANTS ARE VIOLATING THE TERMS OF THEIR OPERATING LICENSES AND MUST EITHER BE BROUGHT INTO COMPLIANCE OR SHUT DOWN.
With the current system, they assert, the plants are violating a mandatory condition of their operating licenses.

ACCORDING TO NRC STATUTES, THIS IS A MAJOR ISSUE.

YOU MAY NOT BELIEVE WHAT HAPPENED NEXT...
As the issue was debated within the agency, the Mathews group cast a wider net and began looking at the root causes of shutdowns in the US and abroad, while pushing the agency to more forcefully addresses the design problem.

To their surprise, they found 13 “open phase events” over a 14-year period, with the latest taking place at the Oconee Nuclear Power Station in South Carolina in December, 2015.
Further, the analysis of the twin events at the Byron plants produced a calculation that the risk of a full or partial meltdown had been 1 in 1,000.  By comparison, the NRC’s preferred safety margin is 1 in about 8 million.

The risk at Byron was such that, initially, the agency considered changing the operating rating of Byron from green, the color associated with the most efficient, well run plants, to red, which is one step away from being shut down.
A decision was made by NRC management, however, that it would be unfair to penalize Byron for a systemic problem that applied to the entire American nuclear fleet."

IS THE NRC CRAZY OR JUST CRIMINAL?

IF ONE OF THESE REACTORS MELTS DOWN, SHOULDN'T WE CHARGE THE NRC WITH CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY FOR KNOWING ABOUT THIS FOR ALL THESE YEARS AND DOING NOTHING TO SAFEGUARD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE?
WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?
MAYBE NOTHING!

HOW MUCH DO YOU CARE WHAT HAPPENS?
ENOUGH TO GET INVOLVED?
IF SO, READ ON...

"The 2.206 petition first goes to the director of the agency’s Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for an opinion. 
The Commissioners can then assess the issue and adopt, modify, or overrule the director’s opinion.

IN THE MEANTIME, ANY U.S. CITIZEN SUPPOSEDLY CAN CONTACT THE NRC WITH CONCERNES...SO SAYS THEIR WEBSITE...
GO EXPRESS YOUR CONCERN.... IF YOU ARE CONCERNED...

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/allegations/safety-concern.html

“All along,” said David Lochbaum, “the engineers were told that this was a really big deal, and THEN the Office of Legal Counsel shoots it down and senior management apparently says it hasn’t happened often so let’s move on.
“A larger issue, then, is why did these guys have to take the petition route?

Why didn’t senior managers back them up?

Since the current reactor oversight program was adopted in 2000 there have only been 4 or 5 incidents that warranted a red finding against a plant. 

Then this comes up, and it’s a red finding on the whole industry, and the engineers are told to give up.
“What kind of safety regulation is that?”

PEOPLE OF AMERICA, IF THIS FAILS TO SHOW YOU THAT OUR SAFETY COMES LAST TO OUR CURSED NRC, THAT SAVING MONEY FOR THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY COMES FIRST, AS IT ALWAYS HAS, THEN NOTHING WILL.

THIS IS A BLATANT, WILLFUL CHOICE BY THE NRC TO SAVE 'BIG NUKE' MILLIONS OF DOLLARS WHILE ENDANGERING OUR LIVES!

THE TEA ROOM SEES IT AS ABSOLUTELY CRIMINAL, AS WANTON DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIVES, AS A SURE SIGN THAT THE NRC HAS NOT AND WILL NOT PUT PUBLIC SAFETY ABOVE COSTS TO THE NUCLEAR ENERGY INDUSTRY FOR NECESSARY, LIFE-SAVING REPAIRS THAT CAN KEEP AMERICA FROM EXPERIENCING A CHERNOBYL, OR A FUKUSHIMA AT ONE OR MORE OF OUR 100+ NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.

ALL IT WILL TAKE IS ANOTHER UNDETECTED FAILURE, JUST ONE MORE "UNUSUAL EVENT" THAT DOES NOT GET DISCOVERED OR CORRECTED IN TIME AND AMERICAN LIVES WILL BE NEEDLESSLY LOST. 

HOW MUCH IS A HUMAN LIFE WORTH TO THE NRC AND ITS DARLING LICENSEES? 

THEY OBVIOUSLY PUT NO VALUE ON OUR LIVES!
THEY'D RATHER MAKE PROFITS.
THEY'D RATHER SAVE THEMSELVES THE PUBLICITY THAT SO MANY NECESSARY SHUTDOWNS FOR REPAIRS WOULD CAUSE.

IF ALL OF AMERICA SAW HOW LAX THE NRC AND "BIG NUKE" ARE, WE MIGHT JUST DECIDE THEY SHOULD SHUT DOWN FOREVER!


Hats off and a bow to these seven brave men who chose to put American LIVES above job security.

Hats off to the Yonkers Tribune for presenting such a telling article.

Now, we have the choice to raise our own voices or sit silent once again.

ON ANOTHER VERY MAJOR ISSUE THAT FEW ARE AWARE OF, THE NRC HAS BEGUN ACCEPTING NUCLEAR WASTE FROM ANY/EVERY NATION THAT WANTS TO DUMP IN AMERICA, WITH 455  LARGE"CASKS" OF HIGH-LEVEL URANIUM WASTE INCOMING FROM GERMANY.

THESE ARE TO BE VERY UNSAFELY STORED ABOVE GROUND, SITTING DUCK TARGETS FOR ANYONE INTERESTED IN A BIT OF "TERRORIST ACTIVITY",  IN SOUTH CAROLINA...FOR UP TO 10 YEARS.

SEE COLLINS' TAKE ON IT AT MINING AWARENESS PLUS

AND, IF YOU CARE OR DARE, GO LEAVE THE DOGS AT NRC A COMMENT ON THIS ONE.

The comment deadline is March 11 at 11.59 pm US Eastern Time for ALL Americans to respond to the NRC's negligence: http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOE_FRDOC_0001-3020



AGAIN, ON THE ISSUE OF THE FLAWED DESIGN IN ALL OUR REACTOR SITES, GO TO
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/allegations/safety-concern.html

HERE'S WHAT THE NRC 'PROMISES'...
Non-Emergency


Including any concern involving a nuclear reactor, nuclear fuel facility, or radioactive materials.

You may send an e-mail to Allegations.

However, because e-mail transmission may not be completely secure, if you are concerned about protecting your identity it is preferable that you contact us by phone or in person. You may contact any NRC employee (including a resident inspector) or call:

NRC's Toll-Free Safety Hotline:
(800) 695-7403

Note: If you call the NRC's toll-free Safety Hotline during normal business hours (7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time), your call will automatically be directed to the NRC Regional Office for your geographical area.

If you call after normal business hours, or your call can't be answered during normal business hours by the Region, your call will be directed to the NRC's Headquarters Operations Center, which is a recorded line and manned 24 hours a day.

Some materials and activities are regulated by Agreement States and States: Learn more about Non-Emergency Concerns Involving Agreement States and States.

Learn more about NRC's Response to Non-Emergency Safety Concerns. 

THAT'S RIGHT, CADETS...LEARN...LEARN OR PERISH...