A GROWING LIST OF "NEAR MISS" FAILURES, NEGLECT, KNOWN DESIGN FLAWS, POOR MANAGEMENT, SAFETY VIOLATIONS, UNMONITORED STORAGE CONTAINERS, 'ACCIDENTS' THAT COULD HAVE BEEN AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED, COMPLAINTS THAT WERE VERIFIED, AND 'WE-JUST-DON'T-GIVE-A-DAMN' MOMENTS OF THE NON-REGULATING NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONS AND THEIR DARLINGS, AMERICA'S FAILING AND DEADLY NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS...
VERY FEW AMERICANS REALIZE HOW MANY COMPLAINTS, HOW MANY SAFETY CONCERNS THE NRC GETS ABOUT ITS NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS EACH YEAR.
FEWER MAY BE AWARE HOW MANY HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIATED...BUT THEN NOTHING IS DONE....OVER AND OVER AGAIN, THE SAME CYCLE...CONCERNED CITIZENS COMPLAIN OR DOCUMENT PROBLEMS, THE NRC DOES NOTHING OR DOES VERY LITTLE TO "FIX" THE ISSUES.
IN JUST A FOUR-YEAR TIME FRAME THE NRC LISTS OVER 130 "OPEN ALLEGATIONS" AGAINST ITS PRECIOUS ONES...OUR FAILING, CRUMBLY OLD NUKE FACILITIES....STANDING 30 YEARS PAST THEIR INTENDED USEFULNESS.
SOME ARE STILL "OPEN" FROM 2012, UNDECIDED/UNRESOLVED ...OR JUST SHOVED ASIDE?
"OPEN"?
OPEN TO WHAT?
CERTAINLY NOT OPEN TO FURTHER, MEANINGFUL INVESTIGATION AFTER 4 YEARS, DO YOU THINK?
SEE, "REACTOR OPEN ALLEGATIONS BY CY RECEIVED*: January 2012 - January 2016"
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/allegations/stats/10-rx-open.pdf
AND HOW MANY ALLEGATIONS DID THE NRC FIND THAT WERE SUBSTANTIATED?
I ALMOST FELL OFF MY CHAIR WHEN I SAW THAT THE NRC HAD LISTED EVEN ONE AS "SUBSTANTIATED", BUT 201?
201 SUBSTANTIATED?
23 IN 2015...
47 IN 2014...
59 IN 2013...
72 IN 2012...
SEE FOR YOURSELF AT...
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/allegations/stats/13-rx-sub.pdf
I ALMOST FELL OFF MY CHAIR WHEN I SAW THAT THE NRC HAD LISTED EVEN ONE AS "SUBSTANTIATED", BUT 201?
201 SUBSTANTIATED?
23 IN 2015...
47 IN 2014...
59 IN 2013...
72 IN 2012...
SEE FOR YOURSELF AT...
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/allegations/stats/13-rx-sub.pdf
WANT TO GUESS WHEN THE NRC LAST UPDATED THAT PAGE?
"Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, October 10, 2014"
SO, HOW DID THEY ADD THE 2015 STATS IN 2014?
"IT'S MAGIC!"
RECENT "NEAR MISSES", WHEN AMERICA CAME CLOSE TO NUCLEAR DISASTER, PERHAPS NEAR YOU...ONLY 4 EXAMPLES.
1- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) sent a special inspection team to the Oconee Nuclear Station in Seneca, South Carolina on January 5, 2016, after a worker found an electrical cable disconnected from a backup power supply for Unit 3.
"Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, October 10, 2014"
SO, HOW DID THEY ADD THE 2015 STATS IN 2014?
"IT'S MAGIC!"
RECENT "NEAR MISSES", WHEN AMERICA CAME CLOSE TO NUCLEAR DISASTER, PERHAPS NEAR YOU...ONLY 4 EXAMPLES.
1- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) sent a special inspection team to the Oconee Nuclear Station in Seneca, South Carolina on January 5, 2016, after a worker found an electrical cable disconnected from a backup power supply for Unit 3.
The following week, workers found a similarly disconnected cable on a backup power supply for Unit 1.
At 8:20 am, an operator found a completely disconnected cable between the 230 KV switchyard and Unit 3 startup transformer (CT3). After checking with the engineering staff, the operators declared the Unit 3 startup transformer inoperable at 8:47 am.
With startup transformer CT3 out of service because of the broken cable and the underground line from Keowee de-energized for maintenance, the two vital in-plant electrical circuits on Unit 3 were without their two primary sources of backup power.
The cable was broken and the backup power source unavailable for a LONG period of time.
How long?
No one knows.
The NRC’s special inspection team did not identify any violations of safety regulations.
NOT EVEN A SLAP ON THE WRIST...
"FINE JOB, BOYS!
ROCK ON!"
2- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) sent a special inspection team to the Indian Point Energy Center in New York after an electrical transformer on Unit 3 exploded May 9, 2015, and burned.
But the NRC team was not investigating the cause and effect of the transformer’s problem—they were examining how water flooded the room housing the electrical distribution panels.
Had the flooding not been discovered and stopped in time, the panels could have been submerged and disabled, plunging Unit 3 into a station blackout condition like the one that caused disaster at Fukushima four years earlier.
SAME SCREW-UP AS IN 2011, 2013, AND EARLIER IN 2015, COULD HAVE KILLED THOUSANDS, BUT GUESS WHAT?
THE LEAST POSSIBLE CITATION WAS ISSUED!
The NRC determined that the flooding was caused by a component that had malfunctioned when it was tested in March 2015, April 2013, and April 2011, and that repeatedly unfixed failure once again caused flooding during the May 2015 event.
For repeatedly violating a federal regulation that requires owners to fix problems in a timely manner, the NRC issued a green finding, the least serious in its four color-coded sanction levels.
3- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) sent a special inspection team to the River Bend nuclear plant in St. Francisville, Louisiana on March 30, 2015, after a periodic test of the plant’s response to a simulated accident condition resulted in total loss of air conditioning for vital rooms in the control building.
At 8:20 am, an operator found a completely disconnected cable between the 230 KV switchyard and Unit 3 startup transformer (CT3). After checking with the engineering staff, the operators declared the Unit 3 startup transformer inoperable at 8:47 am.
With startup transformer CT3 out of service because of the broken cable and the underground line from Keowee de-energized for maintenance, the two vital in-plant electrical circuits on Unit 3 were without their two primary sources of backup power.
The cable was broken and the backup power source unavailable for a LONG period of time.
How long?
No one knows.
The NRC’s special inspection team did not identify any violations of safety regulations.
NOT EVEN A SLAP ON THE WRIST...
"FINE JOB, BOYS!
ROCK ON!"
2- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) sent a special inspection team to the Indian Point Energy Center in New York after an electrical transformer on Unit 3 exploded May 9, 2015, and burned.
But the NRC team was not investigating the cause and effect of the transformer’s problem—they were examining how water flooded the room housing the electrical distribution panels.
Had the flooding not been discovered and stopped in time, the panels could have been submerged and disabled, plunging Unit 3 into a station blackout condition like the one that caused disaster at Fukushima four years earlier.
SAME SCREW-UP AS IN 2011, 2013, AND EARLIER IN 2015, COULD HAVE KILLED THOUSANDS, BUT GUESS WHAT?
THE LEAST POSSIBLE CITATION WAS ISSUED!
The NRC determined that the flooding was caused by a component that had malfunctioned when it was tested in March 2015, April 2013, and April 2011, and that repeatedly unfixed failure once again caused flooding during the May 2015 event.
For repeatedly violating a federal regulation that requires owners to fix problems in a timely manner, the NRC issued a green finding, the least serious in its four color-coded sanction levels.
3- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) sent a special inspection team to the River Bend nuclear plant in St. Francisville, Louisiana on March 30, 2015, after a periodic test of the plant’s response to a simulated accident condition resulted in total loss of air conditioning for vital rooms in the control building.
4- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) sent a special inspection
team to Calvert Cliffs (Lusby, Maryland) to investigate electrical
fluctuations on the offsite power grid that caused both reactors to
automatically shut down on April 27, 2015, and problems with both of the
standby emergency diesel generators on Unit 2.
The failure of both emergency diesel generators on Unit 2 did not result in reactor core damage because the non-safety-related buses continued supplying power to non-emergency equipment that performed the roles intended for the emergency equipment. The operators successfully started and connected the station blackout diesel generator to restore power to SOME of the emergency equipment.
NRC sanctions?
NOPE!
"The NRC’s investigations identified no violations of regulatory requirements"
The failure of both emergency diesel generators on Unit 2 did not result in reactor core damage because the non-safety-related buses continued supplying power to non-emergency equipment that performed the roles intended for the emergency equipment. The operators successfully started and connected the station blackout diesel generator to restore power to SOME of the emergency equipment.
NRC sanctions?
NOPE!
"The NRC’s investigations identified no violations of regulatory requirements"
SURELY THE NRC HAS A WELL-WORN RUBBER STAMP WITH THOSE WORDS...
I CAN IMAGINE THE FOLLOWING HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION AND THE NRS's 'FINDINGS':
"NUCLEAR POWER PLANT WORKERS PULL ALL PLUGS, SOME ARE FOUND PASSED-OUT DRUNK, OTHERS SNORTING COCAINE IN AN EMERGENCY SAFE ROOM, FACILITY IN THE FLAMES...THOUSANDS EXPOSED TO LETHAL DOSES OF RADIATION.
NRC SENDS INVESTIGATIVE TEAM.
The NRC’s SIT identified no violations of regulatory requirements."
READ A FEW MORE LIKE THIS AT
http://allthingsnuclear.org/tag/near-misses-at-u-s-nuclear-power-plants#.Vt1HSeZhfIU
I CAN IMAGINE THE FOLLOWING HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION AND THE NRS's 'FINDINGS':
"NUCLEAR POWER PLANT WORKERS PULL ALL PLUGS, SOME ARE FOUND PASSED-OUT DRUNK, OTHERS SNORTING COCAINE IN AN EMERGENCY SAFE ROOM, FACILITY IN THE FLAMES...THOUSANDS EXPOSED TO LETHAL DOSES OF RADIATION.
NRC SENDS INVESTIGATIVE TEAM.
The NRC’s SIT identified no violations of regulatory requirements."
READ A FEW MORE LIKE THIS AT
http://allthingsnuclear.org/tag/near-misses-at-u-s-nuclear-power-plants#.Vt1HSeZhfIU
ABOVE, THE MANY PROBLEMS CONFIRMED AT SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AFTER NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS.
EVEN CLOSED, SAN ONOFRE WILL LEAK FOR CENTURIES.
OLD PEACH BOTTOM...ITS STAFF ASLEEP ON THE JOB, BUSTED!
VIDEO ABOVE SHOWS THE FACTS...
YOU ARE NOT IN GOOD HANDS, PENNSYLVANIA!
On March 24, 1987, the NRC’s Region I office received allegations from a whistleblower that operators at the Peach Bottom nuclear plant were sleeping on duty in the control room.
The NRC immediately sent inspectors to the Pennsylvania plant to investigate.
HOW SAFE ARE THE STORAGE CONTAINERS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS?
NOT NEARLY AS SAFE AS WE'RE LED TO BELIEVE...
The NRC said they have no current
mitigation plan for that consequence. They suggested we MIGHT be able
to put the fuel back in the spent fuel pool. However, Edison plans to
destroy the spent fuel and transfer pools. And there is no technology to
repair the canisters. The NRC said they HOPE there will be a solution
for mitigation in the future. Even an NRC May 2nd High Burnup Fuel
letter admits there are mitigation problems.
No Inspections of Stainless Steel Canisters
The NRC proposed having each nuclear plant inspect the outside of only ONE stainless steel canister before they receive a license renewal and then do that once every 5 years.
The industry balked at having to even check one canister at every plant.
THEY BALKED AND THE NRC DID NOT FORCE THE ISSUE!
STAINLESS STEEL DOES NOT SHIELD AGAINST GAMMA RAYS.
The problem with the stainless steel canisters is they do not protect against gamma rays; so it’s not a simple task to remove a canister from the concrete overpack/cask to examine the exterior for corrosion or other degradation. And since welded canisters do not have monitoring for helium leaks, we may not have any warning of an impending radiation release.
THE TEA ROOM IS OF THE OPINION THAT, IF THE NUKE INDUSTRY SAID THEY WERE GOING TO STORE NUCLEAR WASTE IN RECYCLED SHOE BOXES THEN THE NRC's BIG BOYS WOULD RUN OUT AND BUY SHOES, AS WOULD MOST OF CONGRESS.
THE "READING ROOM OF "UNUSUAL" NUCLEAR EVENTS";
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/en.html
MOST RECENT?
- BEAVER FALLS, 02/23/2016
-BRUNSWICK IN NORTH CAROLINA, 02/07/2016
-THREE MILE ISLAND, UNIT 1, 12/28/2015
Significant Near-Misses at Nuclear Power Plants, 1988–2001
THE NRC's SO-CALLED "INSPECTION REPORTS" ARE ALSO ONLINE AND FREE FOR THE LAUGHING, I MEAN READING...
GET 'EM WHILE THEY'RE HOT...
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/listofrpts_body.html
EVERY ONE OF THE NRC's 'BABIES' GOT PRETEND INSPECTIONS AND THEN A SMOOCH ON THE BUTTOCKS.
THING IS, NONE SEEM TO HAVE BEEN INSPECTED FOR A LONG TIME, LOOKS LIKE...SPRING OF LAST YEAR OR SO.
THEN WE REALIZE...THAT'S THE NORM, AND THEN WE LEARN THAT THERE ARE NO "SURPRISE" INSPECTIONS.
POWER REACTOR STATUS REPORTS, ANYONE?
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/reactor-status/
THEY COULD SAVE US ALL A LOT OF TIME IF THEY JUST WROTE:
"ALL POWERED UP AND LEAKING LIKE SIEVES".
OR MAYBE JUST, "BURN, BABY, BURN!"
IF WE DON'T READ, WE DON'T KNOW, RIGHT, FOLKS?
FOR THOSE WHO HAD RATHER PICK LINT FROM THEIR NAVELS THAN READ AN ENTIRE PAGE...
NUCLEAR CONTAMINATION, OVER-SIMPLIFIED...
NOW THE NRC HAS A NIFTY BOOK ON HOW DANGEROUS RADIOACTIVE IODINE IS, BUT LOOK AT THESE PRICES!
| Product Details: |
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| Report No. 159 - Risk to the Thyroid from Ionizing Radiation (2008) |
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| Formats Available: hardcopy, electronic (downloadable PDF) |
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ALSO SEE http://emergency.cdc.gov/radiation/pdf/infographic_nuclear_power_plant.pdf
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
"DISASTER BY DESIGN"
http://allthingsnuclear.org/dlochbaum/remote-control-at-nuclear-power-plants
DESIGNED TO FAIL
- Operators have had to abandon the control room of at least one U.S. nuclear power reactor. On August 7, 1997, a member of the training department took a picture of a fire detection panel inside the control room of the Haddam Neck nuclear plant in Connecticut (now permanently closed for reasons unrelated to this picture-taking.) The camera’s flash tricked the fire detector circuit into sensing a fire. Seconds later, the fire suppression system discharged Halon gas into the control room. Seconds later, the operators fled the control room. Halon gas extinguishes fires by reducing the oxygen concentration below the level needed to sustain combustion, which is also below the level needed to sustain living. For 35 minutes, the operators monitored controls through a window in an adjacent room, darting back into the control room when necessary to response to alarms.
- In April 1989, NRC inspectors discovered a problem at the Trojan nuclear plant in Oregon (now permanently closed for reasons unrelated to either this NRC discovery or the picture taken at Haddam Neck) that had the potential of forcing operators to abandon the control room. The NRC inspectors raised concern about ten large storage tanks located on the roof of the control room. Four of the tanks contained hydrogen gas while the other six tanks contained nitrogen gas. The pressure relief valves for the hydrogen storage tanks were near the intake for the control room ventilation system. The NRC inspectors were concerned that hydrogen or nitrogen gas leaking from these tanks could find its way into the control room and force the operators to find their way out of it. In addition, the NRC inspectors calculated that the hydrogen gas had the explosive energy equivalent to 217 pounds of TNT—a hazard that really should not be sitting on the control room’s roof.
- In the mid 1980s, NRC inspectors on a tour of the Grand Gulf nuclear plant near Port Gibson, Mississippi asked the Operations Superintendent for a look at the remote shutdown panel. The Operations Superintendent held a Senior Reactor Operator license issued by the NRC and managed all the control room and equipment operators at Grand Gulf. The Operations Superintendent guided the NRC inspectors to a few places within the plant, but was never able to find the little room housing the remote shutdown panel. The following day, equipment operators taped signs throughout the plant to help the Operations Superintendent find the remote shutdown panel: “You’re Getting Warmer,” “Wrong Turn, Should Have Zigged Right instead of Left,” “Wrong Floor–Try Two Flights Down” and other aids.
- On September 16, 2015, operators discovered that the control switch on the remote shutdown panel for the Unit 2 reactor at the Peach Bottom nuclear plant in Pennsylvania would not open a valve needed for the reactor cooling system to work. Maintenance workers found that a wire was disconnected from the control switch. The periodic tests of the remote shutdown panel did not check whether the valve could be opened and records did not indicate when, if ever, the control switch had been properly wired and functional.
- On June 2, 2005, workers at the Duane Arnold nuclear plant in Iowa discovered that a fire in the control room could cause electrical circuits to short out. Failure of those circuits could initiate a sequence of events that would include turning off the power the remote shutdown panel.
- On November 2, 2002, an electrical fault caused a small fire in an instrumentation panel in the control room for the Unit 2 reactor at the Brunswick nuclear plant near Southport, North Carolina. Six weeks later, workers investigating electrical circuits as a result of the fire found that an electrical short in the 125 volt direct current system could cause all the power supply fuses to the remote shutdown panel to blow.
- On December 14, 1995, the owner of the Unit 2 reactor at the Hatch nuclear plant near Baxley, Georgia, notified the NRC about five problems with its remote shutdown panel. A design error in the control transfer scheme for one valve would have prevented its control switch on the remote shutdown panel from being able to open the valve. Two other valves had loose or disconnected wires that prevented them from being operated from the remote shutdown panel. Two other valves had problems with the limit switches used to monitor whether the valves were opened or closed; these problems prevented the valves from being opened from the remote shutdown panel. All five valves had successfully passed periodic tests for years. Hatch was the pilot plant for Improved Technical Specifications. When workers performed the revised tests of the remote shutdown panel required by the Improved Technical Specifications, the latent problems were identified.
- On May 21, 1992, the owner of the Columbia Generating Station (then known as the Washington Nuclear Plant–Unit 2) near Hanford, Washington, informed the NRC about a design error for its remote shutdown panel dating back to initial reactor startup in 1984. The remote shutdown panel for the boiling water reactor at the Columbia Generating Station has control switches and associated instrumentation for the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system to protect against nuclear fuel damage in event the control room has to be abandoned. The RCIC system uses a steam turbine connected to a pump to transfer makeup water into the reactor vessel. But the power supply for the RCIC turbine control circuit was not included in the original design of the remote shutdown panel. The design flaw had not been uncovered during the periodic tests performed for the remote shutdown panel even though the flaw could have prevented the RCIC system from working.
Fuksushima’s protective seawall did not rise to the challenge when a large tsunami arrived at the site on March 11, 2011.
Will the remote shutdown panel rise to the challenged?
Perhaps, but probably not.
Testing has proven unreliable in finding problems that could have prevented the remote shutdown panels from preventing reactor core damage.
Workers seldom, if ever, receive training on cooling the reactor core using the scant controls on the remote shutdown panels. The Operations Superintendent at Grand Gulf could not even find the panel, hardly instilling more confidence in his ability to successfully use it had someone else shown him its location.
Every U.S. nuclear power plant must conduct a large-scale exercise of its emergency response procedures at least once every two years. Every U.S. nuclear power plant must conduct force-on-test exercises of its security measures pitting mock intruders against its guards at least once every three years. That’s a lot of exercises over the past three decades. But a search of ADAMs failed to identify even one time when a safety or security exercise involved operators simulating having to abandon the control room and attempt to cool the reactor core from the remote shutdown panel.
So, will the remote shutdown panel be more successful than Fukushima’s seawall in preventing core damage?
Perhaps, but probably not.
IN THEIR OWN WORDS, THE NRC AND UNPUBLICIZED FACTS
NRC Presentations and documents
FAILING WASTE STORAGE CONTAINERS
NRC Meeting to Obtain Stakeholder Input on Potential Changes to Guidance for Renewal of Spent Fuel Dry Cask Storage System Licenses and Certificates of Compliance, July 14th/15th, 2014 (includes slide presentations)
Chloride-Induced Stress Corrosion
Cracking Tests and Example Aging Management Program, Darrell S. Dunn,
NRC/NMSS/SFST, Public Meeting with NEI on Chloride Induced Stress
Corrosion Cracking Regulatory Issue Resolution Protocol, August 5, 2014
NRC Information Notice 2012-20:
Potential Chloride-Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking of Austenitic
Stainless Steel and Maintenance of Dry Cask Storage System
Canisters. November 14, 2012
BAM test results for CASTOR transport containers
Nuclear Waste http://sanonofresafety.org/nuclear-waste/
SUMMED UP FOR NON-READERS:
WE BREATHE IT, DRINK IT, EAT IT, GET RAINED ON BY IT, SWIM IN IT, IT'S ON EVERY WIND, AND WE "GET SOME" FROM EVERY LEAKING NUCLEAR FACILITY IN THIS COUNTRY...AND FUKUSHIMA, CHERNOBYL, ETC.
WE EVEN GET IT IN TODAY'S RAIN FROM THE INITIAL WEAPONS TESTS BACK IN THE 1940s TO 1990s... IT'S STILL "UP THERE" AND STILL RAINING DOWN.
GOT IT?
"NUCLEAR POWER IS FOREVER"
wow!
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