NEUTRINO BEAM SEEN 13 TIMES AT FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI PLANT

An aerial view of the Daiichi facility in March 2011.
http://www.japanfocus.org/data/reactor_aerial.png

THE THINGS OUR MAINSTREAM MEDIA DOESN'T BOTHER TO PRINT ARE OFTEN THE VERY THINGS WE NEED TO KNOW.

WE DO KNOW THAT NEW EXPLOSIONS AT FUKUSHIMA ARE NOT ONLY POSSIBLE, BUT EXPECTED.
WE JUST DON'T KNOW WHEN.

May 27, 2015

Four years after disaster struck at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, a United Nations watchdog organization has highlighted remaining dangers at the plant, including the possibility of a hydrogen explosion, while criticizing its operators for their lack of preparedness.

Now held in 1,307 containers at the plant, it appears the radioactive water is leaking, according to a report by the plant’s operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), given to Japan’s Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRA) on Friday. TEPCO inspected 278 of the water containers and found that at least 26 leak.

The leaks are likely caused by accumulating hydrogen and other gases, an issue that’s raising alarm among government officials. “If the concentration level is high, a spark caused by static electricity could cause a container to [explode],” said a representative of the NRA.

Despite the ongoing risks, Japan’s ruling government plans to allow most former residents to return to the region in the near future."

NO, THEY ARE BASICALLY BEING FORCED BACK BECAUSE THEY WILL BE RECEIVING NO FURTHER TEMPORARY HOUSING FUNDS FROM THE GOVERNMENT OR TEPCO.

NEUTRINO BEAMS AT DAIICHI

THE FOLLOWING IS FROM 'THE JAPAN TIMES NEWS'
O3/24/2011

Tokyo Electric Power Co. said Wednesday it has observed a neutron beam, a kind of radioactive ray, 13 times on the premises of its crippled Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant.

Tepco said the neutron beam measured about 1.5 km southwest of the plant’s Nos. 1 and 2 reactors over three days from March 13 and is equivalent to 0.01 to 0.02 microsieverts per hour. This is not a dangerous level of radiation, it added.

The utility said it will also measure uranium and plutonium, which could emit a neutron beam.

In the 1999 criticality accident at a nuclear fuel processing plant run by JCO Co. in Tokai, Ibaraki Prefecture, uranium broke apart continually in nuclear fission, causing a massive amount of neutron beams.

[AND THEN, THIS, THOUGH THEY SURELY KNEW BETTER, DIDN'T THEY?]

In the latest case at the Fukushima No. 1 plant, a criticality accident has yet to happen.

But the measured neutron beam may be evidence that uranium and plutonium leaked from the plant’s nuclear reactors and spent nuclear fuel have discharged a small amount of neutron beams via fission."

THE VERY NEXT DAY, MARCH 25, TEPCO PUBLISHED  LEVELS OF CHLORINE-38
 (1.6 MBq/mL) IN THE SEAWATER USED TO COOL REACTOR #1. 
[SEE CHART BELOW]

http://www.japanfocus.org/data/9619_table_1.PNG

THIS STRONGLY 'SUGGESTED' A TRANSIENT CRITICALITY HAD OCCURRED. 
BUT, IMPORTANT TO ALL NEAR THE FACILITY ON MARCH 25 IS highly radioactive water HAD ALREADY been found in the turbine buildings of units 1 and 2, and that several workers had received radiation burns to their ankle areas from standing in that water. [See Timeline below for March 24-25]

SO THE COOLING WATER WAS FLOWING WITH Cl-38 AND NOBODY MENTIONED THIS UNTIL MARCH 30.

The presence of highly radioactive water in three turbine buildings at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant is widely understood to be from the damaged fuel rods in the reactors.  This has rightly raised concerns because it indicates several problems including extensive fuel damage and leaks in the piping system.  

Less attention has been paid to the presence of a very short-lived radionuclide, chlorine-38, in the water in the turbine building of Unit 1.  

The following paper evaluates whether its presence provides evidence of a serious problem – one or more unintended chain reactions (technically: unintended criticalities) – in the reactor.  

Such chain reactions create bursts of fission products and energy, both of which could cause further damage and aggravate working conditions that are already very difficult.

Chlorine-38, which has a half-life of only 37 minutes, is created when stable chlorine-37, which is about one-fourth of the chlorine in salt, absorbs a neutron.  

Since seawater has been used to cool, there is now a large amount of salt – thousands of kilograms – in all three reactors.  

Now, if a reactor is truly shut down, there is only one significant source of neutrons, namely, the spontaneous fission of some heavy metals which are created when the reactor is working and remain present in the reactor fuel.  

The most important ones are two isotopes of plutonium and two of curium.  

But if accidental chain reactions are occurring, it means that the efforts to completely shut down the reactor by mixing boron with the seawater have NOTcompletely succeeded.  

Periodic criticalities, or even a single accidental one, would mean that highly radioactive fission and activation products are being (or have been) created at least in Unit 1 since it was shut down.  

It would also mean that one or more intense bursts of neutrons, which cause heavy radiation damage to people, have occurred and possibly could occur again, unless the mechanism is understood and measures taken to prevent it.  Measures would also need to be taken to protect workers and to measure potential neutron and gamma radiation exposure.

This paper examines whether spontaneous fission alone could be responsible for the chlorine-38 found in the water of the turbine building of Unit 1.
 If that could be the only explanation, there would be less to be concerned about. 

 However, the analysis indicates that it is quite unlikely that spontaneous fission is the sole or even the main explanation for the measured concentration of chlorine-38.  

Presuming the reported measurements are correct, this leaves only one other explanation – one or more unintended chain reactions (CRITICALITIES).  

This paper is presented in the spirit of encouraging discussion of whether further safety measures might be needed, and whether supplementary measures to bring the reactors under control should be considered.  It is also presented as a preliminary analysis for scientific discussion of a terrible and technically challenging nuclear crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi plant.

[READ THE FULL DOCUMENT <HERE>, BUT LET'S GO TO THE CONCLUSION:

Conclusions

So we are left with the uncomfortable realization that the cause of the Cl-38 concentrations is not seawater intercepting neutrons fromnatural spontaneous fission of the used nuclear fuel. 

There has to be another reason.

 A transient criticality could explain the observed 13“neutron beams” reported by Kyodo news agency . 

This analysis is not a definitive proof, but it does mean that we cannot rule out localized criticality and TEPCO should assure that the workers take the necessary precautions.

Arjun Makhijani March 30, 2011
SEE:  Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress and Arjun Makhijani, What Caused the High Cl-38 Radioactivity in the Fukushima Daiichi Reactor #1?, The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol 9, Issue 14 No 3, April 4, 2011."

TEPCO RESPONDED, ON APRIL 20, BY RETRACTING THEIR READINGS!

"In its press release of April 20, TEPCO has retracted the Cl-38 radioactivity concentration measurement (1.6 MBq/mL) for the seawater used to cool reactor #1 that it had issued on March 25, saying that it was "below minimum detectable density". 
Based on this original measurement, we had determined that the value was too high to be explained without invoking the possibility of inadvertent, transient criticalities. 

MY QUESTION IS THIS:
WASN'T ANYONE ELSE ON THIS PLANET ALSO MONITORING THAT PLANT AFTER THAT ACCIDENT?

REALLY, CAN WE BELIEVE THAT ONLY TEPCO HAD THE ABILITY TO MEASURE WHAT WAS BEING EMITTED FROM THAT WRECKAGE?

IS TEPCO ALLOWED TO JUST RETRACT ANYTHING IT PLEASES, ANY TIME IT WISHES TO COVER ITS OWN BARE BEHIND?

SINCE IT TOOK THEM 25 DAYS TO RETRACT THE MEASUREMENTS, MAYBE WE CAN ASSUME THEY HAD TO "SEND OUT" FOR THE TECHNICAL SAVVY TO COME UP WITH THE LANGUAGE OF THE RETRACTION.

SURELY , IF THEY HAD MADE AN ERROR IT WOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN 25 DAYS TO "DISCOVER" IT...IF THEY HAD ANYONE ONBOARD THAT COULD SO MUCH AS IMAGINE WHAT 1.6 MBq/mL OF Cl-38 MEANT.

OBVIOUSLY, TO ME, WHOEVER MADE THOSE READINGS PUBLIC WAS NOT AT ALL ALARMED BY THEM.

ONCE THE SERIOUSNESS AND IMPLICATION OF A CRITICALITY WAS POINTED OUT TO THEM, ONLY THEN, AFTER 25 DAYS, DID TEPCO MAKE A 'BIG DEAL' OF IT AND RETRACT!

THEY KNEW THEY'D SCREWED UP, PROBABLY KNEW THERE HAD BEEN CRITICALITIES, ON APRIL 4th WHEN THEY PUBLISHED THEIR INTENT TO "DO BETTER" AFTER A WARNING FROM.

"On April 4th, 2011, we reported on the preventive measures to be taken
after receiving severe verbal warning from Nuclear and Industrial Safety
Agency (NISA) on April 1st in regard to the results on nuclide analysis at
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station."

THEY WERE BUSTED, SCRAMBLED, MADE CHANGES, RETRACTED...PROBLEM SOLVED!

THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TO TAKE MORE EXTREME AND COSTLY STEPS IN CLEANUP, WOULD NOT HAVE TO ISSUE PUBLIC WARNINGS OF A CRITICALITY, WOULD NOT BE OPEN TO LAWSUIT FOR THEIR INEPTITUDE AND NEGLIGENCE AND COULD GET BACK TO THE SAME SHODDY, DO-NOTHING BUT LOOK LIKE THEY WERE DOING SOMETHING ROUTINE THEY HAVE MAINTAINED TO THIS DAY!

THEY SAVED THEIR OWN BUTTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE HEALTH OF THOSE TRYING TO REPAIR DAMAGES, GET THAT THING UNDER CONTROL, AND THE HEALTH OF ALL NEAR THAT THING WHEN THE CRITICALITY/CRITICALITIES HAPPENED.

MOST ARE NOT AWARE OF THE FULL EXTENT OF ILLEGAL, UNETHICAL RADIATION TESTING ON HUMAN BEINGS BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION AND AFFILIATED LABS WHICH USED HUMANS LIKE LAB RATS.
I HAVE WRITTEN BRIEFLY ABOUT THIS BEFORE.
"AMERICANS WERE GUINEA PIGS IN DEADLY EXPERIMENTS FOR 60 YEARS"

THAT CHLORINE-38 OR Cl-38 THAT TEPCO DETECTED THEN RETRACTED WAS ALSO USED IN THOSE 'HUMAN GUINEA PIG' EXPERIMENTS.
THEY WANTED TO SEE HOW LETHAL AND/OR HOW QUICKLY LETHAL IT WAS.

BELOW IS JUST A SAMPLE OF WHAT WAS DONE WITH Cl-38:

"The list identifies forty-eight human radiation experiments
that were conducted from the 1920's until 1989.  The studies
represent a broad spectrum in terms of purpose, number of subjects,
radioisotopes, degree of severity, dates and places.

ù    The experiments listed are those for which a medical benefit
to the subjects involved was not expected.

ù    Radioisotopes used included:  Arsenic-76; Astatine-211;
Barium-l33,140; Bromine-82; Calcium-45; Californium-252; Carbon-14;
Cesium-132,134,137; Chlorine-36,38; Chromium-51; Gallium-67,72;
Gold-198; Iodine-125,13l; Iron-55,59; Lanthanum-140; Lutetium-l77;
Mercury-203 ,205; Niobium-92m; Phosphorus-32; Potassium-39,42;
Radium-226; Rubidium-86; Sodium-22 ,24; Strontium-85,89;
Technetium-99; Tritiated Thymidine; Atrium-90; Zinc-65;
zirconium-89.

ù    Healthy subjects were included, as well as terminally ill
patients, pregnant women, psychiatric patients, children, and
fetuses.

3.   Distribution of Chlorine-38, Sodium-24, and~Bromine-82 in
Extracellular fluids of Chronically Ill Patients

The total volume of extracellular fluids in 15 humans was studied
at Brookhaven National Laboratory during the period 1952 to 1953.

Five chronically ill hospital patients were injected with Cl-38 and
Na-24, prepared at the Brookhaven Reactor.

Ten other patients were injected with Cl-38 and Br-82.
Blood samples were drawn at various times post-injection
and counted for radioactivity.
The patients were considered to be "normal" subjects for 
purposes of this study.

This work was funded by the Atomic Energy Commission,
and was reported in BNL-1326,
"Chloride, Bromide, Sodium, and Sucrose Spaces in Humans," by J.L.
Gamble, Jr., J.S. Robertson, C.A. Hannigan, C.G. Foster, and L.E.
Farr, dated February 4, 1953.  Reference is made in the text to
three other related studies in normal human subjects to determine
extracellular fluid volumes.
                       http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/radiation/dir/mstreet/commeet/meet4/brief4.gfr/tab_p/br4p1a.txt          
U.S. Department of Energy
Public Affairs Office

BECAUSE TEPCO DID NOT ADMIT WHAT REALLY HAPPENED, COUNTLESS NUMBERS WERE EXPOSED TO FAR MORE THAN THEY WILL EVER KNOW!

I FIND THIS UNETHICAL, IMMORAL, AND A HEINOUS ACT, A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY!

Consequences of Possible “Inadvertent Criticalities”

"So now let’s assume that “inadvertent criticalities” do occur in reactor #1. 

What could the consequences be and how might they manifest themselves? 

New BWR fuel assemblies are located on the refueling floor which at least in one Fukushima reactor is exposed to the atmosphere and may have been disrupted from explosions.  

There is a possibility that the “spontaneous fires” that have been reported may be due to criticality excursions. 

Rod-collapse could lead to loose material where vibrations, water flow and structural collapse of the assembly grid and control rod systems could result in a self-sustaining chain reaction. 

Many are worried about the possibility of starting a chain reaction that becomes super-critical rather than turning itself off due to negative feedback effects. 

The main explanation for not going super critical is that – if transient criticalities have taken place – they are probably due to small globules of fissile material that is expanding and moving in a viscous soup of molten metals and oxides, thus continually changing their mean free path.

 A sudden increase in the neutron flux would be immediately measurable above the background due to the spontaneous fission of the different actinides in the fuel. 

TEPCO must continue to mix Boric acid with the fresh cooling water to ensure that no criticality excursions can occur especially in reactor #1. 

All efforts must be made to protect the workers when the probability for “inadvertent criticalities” are non-zero. I suggest that TEPCO takes the following actions:

-       Install a neutron detector to monitor the core of Fukushima Daiichi reactor #1

-       Keep mixing neutron absorbers with the cooling water for cooling reactor cores and spent nuclear fuel ponds

-       Give complete gamma spectra rather than just the summaries of the results

-       Include not only sampling times but also measurement times for all measurements and repeat measurements to increase confidence in the results.

Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress 
2011 "

THE INCIDENT WAS NEVER LISTED AS A CRITICALITY

"In the history of atomic power development, 60 criticality accidents have occurred, including 22 in collections of fissile materials located in process environments outside of a nuclear reactor or critical experiments assembly. Although process accidents occurring outside of reactors are characterized by a large release of radiation, the release is localized and has caused fatal radiation exposure only to persons very near to the event (less than 1 mile), resulting in 14 fatalities."
[McLaughlin, Thomas P.; et al. (2000). A Review of Criticality Accidents (PDF). Los Alamos: Los Alamos National Laboratory. LA-13638]

NOT LISTED AS ONE THEN, BUT THE BIG BOYS TOOK NOTICE AND DID SOME DAMAGE CONTROL IN ADVANCE OF THE NEXT ONE(S).

"Noting that limited, uncontrolled chain reactions might occur at Fukushima I, a spokesman for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “emphasized that the nuclear reactors won’t explode."
[Jonathan Tirone, Sachiko Sakamaki and Yuriy Humber (March 31, 2011). "Fukushima Workers Threatened by Heat Bursts; Sea Radiation Rises"]

NOT EVEN THE IAEA SAID, UNEQUIVOCALLY, THAT NO SUCH EVENT HAD TAKEN PLACE, JUST THAT NO EXPLOSION WOULD HAPPEN BECAUSE OF THAT.

ANOTHER VIEWPOINT:
 "The spent fuel rods, poorly cooled at certain moments in the pools - exposed because of the missing roof over pool No. 3 and the fire over pool No. 4, urgently in need of refilling by either helicopters or water cannons - have released neutrons. 

These neutrons would seem to have formed "clouds" which can rise into the atmosphere. 
Having been in a certain manner bounced back by the air ceiling, their impact can be felt as much as 1.5 km from their source. 

Specialists call this phenomenon the "sky effect", and it can prove to be dangerous (here the operator specifies that the dose of 0.01 to 0.02 microsieverts per hour remains low). 

In fact, the results of this phenomenon are that for reasons of fundamental physics, it may prove to be more intense elsewhere than near its source.  This is the event that would seem to have happened 13 times, starting on 13 March."

NO ONE WILL EVER KNOW, WILL THEY?
TEPCO RETRACTED.

TEPCO CAUGHT IN MORE LIES THAN CAN BE COUNTED

A VERY SHORT LIST OF PROVEN LIES:

~NHK, Sept. 6, 2013:  The NRA (Nuclear Regulation Authority) says  that water contamination has not spread outside the port for the plant. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga ruled out any effects on the sea of tainted water leaked from the damaged Fukushima nuclear plant. He said the leakage only affects waters in the port at the plant.

THEY HAD BEEN EITHER KNOWINGLY OR "ACCIDENTALLY" DUMPING CONTAMINATED WATER INTO THE PORT/SEA SINCE DAY 1.ANY HIGH SCHOOL KID KNOWS WATER MOVES, RIGHT?DID THEY HOPE WE'D BELIEVE CONTAMINATED WATER IN A PORT WITH A STUPID BOOM ON TOP WOULD KEEP WATER INSIDE THE PORT?

~August 31, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-23918882
TEPCO finally admitted it has been downplaying the ongoing radiation release levels by a factor of almost twenty.
TEPCO had been deliberately using radiation detectors that "max out" at relatively low levels (i.e. they don't go higher than 100 mSv). When those detectors are pegged at their max readings, instead of switching to a more capable instrument with a larger detection range, they simply report the maximum detection limit of the smaller detector as the "real" exposure number.
It now says readings taken near the leaking tank on Saturday showed radiation was high enough to prove lethal within four hours of exposure.

HOW MANY WORKERS THAT SPENT TIME THERE WILL DIE BECAUSE OF THAT LIE?

~ WHEN THE RADIATION LEVELS AT THE PLANT WERE SO HIGH IT "KILLED" A ROBOT IN RECORD TIME, TEPCO HAD TO ADMIT THERE WERE NEW LEAKS. THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY ASSURED THE WORLD LEAKS WERE CONTAINED.05/03/2015 , http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-05-03/tepco-admits-fukushima-leaking-again-over-600x-safe-radiation-levels

~ Eight months after the massive tsunami caused the accident, Tepco said the meltdown had affected only about two-thirds of the rods, but finally had to admit the meltdown of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant in March 2011 involved all the fuel rods in the affected reactor.
Its revised estimate, issued Aug. 6, said Reactor 3’s emergency cooling system stopped working six hours earlier than previously believed, and that the meltdown had begun between four and five hours earlier, as well.

~ Meanwhile, Bloomberg News calculates that Tepco appears likely to miss a deadline to remove a radioactive isotope linked to leukemia from the water stored at the ruined plant. Tepco President Naomi Hirose had promised Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that all the water would be cleaned by March 31, 2015.

~ Reuters investigations have identified widespread abuses at the plant that TEPCO has repeatedly denied..
Tokyo Electric Power Co must give a more thorough account of the Fukushima disaster and address “institutionalized lying” in the company, before it will be permitted to restart the Kashiwazaki Kariwa plant, according to a local governor.

~And last on the very short list, TEPCO and Abe have both said cleanup was rapidly progressing, that they would be able to stop the leaks...in a few years...then it was 30 years, then 40 years, then 100 years and now they say it could take AT LEAST 200 years.

But a British company says that's not true!
They have the technology TEPCO needs TODAY!

SINCE TEPCO AND THE ABE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN EXPOSED AS INCOMPETENT AND AS LIARS, WHY ISN'T THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE U.N., ANYBODY DEMANDING THIS BE TAKEN OUT OF THEIR INCAPABLE HANDS?
______________________






TIMELINE, FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE

Monday, 7 March, 2011
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) submits a report to Japan's nuclear safety agency which predicts the possibility of a tsunami up to 10.2 metres high at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in the event of an earthquake similar to the magnitude 7.2 earthquake with accompanying tsunami that devastated the area in 1896. 

TEPCO actually made this prediction in 2008 but delayed in submitting the report because they "did not feel the need to take prompt action on the estimates"


Friday, 11 March, 2011
15:46 (approximate): A 14-metre (46 ft) tsunami, unleashed by the earthquake, overtops the seawall designed to protect the plant from a tsunami of 5.7 metres (19 ft), inundating the Fukushima facility and disabling the backup diesel generators – all but one of which were housed underground – and washing away their fuel tanks.

With the loss of all electrical power supply, the low-pressure core spray, the residual heat removal and low-pressure coolant injection system main pumps, and the automatic depressurization systems all failed (most of the emergency core cooling system). 
Only the steam-powered pump systems (isolation condenser in reactor 1, high-pressure coolant injection and reactor core isolation cooling system in reactors 2 and 3) remained available. 
A subsequent investigation by NHK would later reveal that the isolation condenser units had not been tested or operated in over 40 years.

[ "The TEPCO Disaster, Two Years Later". Joe Hubris. 2013-04-27.]


From The New York Times,  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/asia/15fuel.html?ref=asia

  "... at the start of the crisis Friday, immediately after the shattering earthquake, Fukushima plant officials focused their attention on a damaged storage pool for spent nuclear fuel at the No. 2 reactor at Daiichi, said a nuclear executive who requested anonymity ... The damage prompted the plant’s management to divert much of the attention and pumping capacity to that pool, the executive added. The shutdown of the other reactors then proceeded badly, and problems began to cascade."

Saturday, 12 March 2011
06:50: Although unknown at the time, the core of reactor 1 has now completely melted and falls to the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel.
[ "Reactor core status of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station Unit 1" (PDF). TEPCO. 15 May 2011] 

15:30: Evacuation of residents within 3 km of Fukushima II and within 10 km of Fukushima I are underway.

15:36: There is a massive explosion in the outer structure of unit 1. The concrete building surrounding the steel reactor vessel collapses as a result of the explosion; however no damage is believed to have been sustained to the reactor itself. 
Four workers are injured.

19:00:TEPCO engineers decided to directly inject seawater inside the pressure vessel of the reactors by means of the mobile trucks of the firemen. The pressure relief was also necessary to allow the firemen to inject seawater into the reactors vessels.

Sunday, 13 March 2011
05:10: Fukushima I Unit 1 is declared as an INES Level-4 "accident with local consequences" event. 
[ "IAEA update on Japan earthquake". IAEA. March 2011.]

09:00: Core damage starts occurring in reactor 3.
A partial meltdown was reported to be possible at unit 3.

13:00 JST: reactors 1 and 3 are vented to release overpressure.

Monday, 14 March 2011
11:01: The unit 3 reactor building explodes, injuring six workers.
According to TEPCO there was no release of radioactive material beyond that already being vented, but blast damage affected the water supply to unit 2.
[http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11031402-e.html]

Tuesday, 15 March 2011
06:00 (APPROXIMATELY) According to TEPCO, an explosion damaged the 4th floor area above the reactor and spent fuel pool of the Unit 4 reactor.
["Damage to the Unit 4 Nuclear Reactor Building at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station" (Press release). Tokyo Electric Power Company. 15 March 2011]

11:00: A second explosion of reactor 3 (according to The World Meteorological Organization report)

Damage to the temporary cooling systems on unit 2 from the explosion in unit 3, plus problems with its venting system, meant that water could not be added to the extent that unit 2 was in the most severe condition of the three reactors.
[Hiroko Tabuchi, Keith Bradsher, Matt Wald (14 March 2011). "Japan faces prospect of nuclear catastrophe as workers leave plant". The New York Times.] 

Wednesday, 16 March 2011
At approximately 14:30 TEPCO announces its belief that the fuel rod storage pool of unit 4 – which is located outside the containment area— may have begun boiling, raising the possibility that exposed rods could reach criticality. By midday NHK TV is reporting white smoke rising from the Fukushima I plant, which officials suggest is likely coming from reactor 3.

Thursday, 17 March 2011
Self-Defense Force helicopters, dropping water onto the reactors,  measure radiation field of 3.75 Sv/h above Unit 3.
[http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A109.pdf]

After watching the helicopter effort on TV Kazunori Hasegawa, president of Chuo Construction, calls the government and offers the use of his two truck-mounted concrete boom pumps to spray water directly into the reactors. TEPCO did not respond for three days, and then stated it would wait for the arrival of similar pumps obtained elsewhere.
[Higgins, Andrew, "Early disorder intensified Japan’s crisis", Washington Post, 19 April 2011.] 

WHY WOULD TEPCO WASTE TIME WAITING FOR THOSE WHEN THEY COULD HAVE HAD THEM THAT DAY?

Friday, 18 March 2011
For the second consecutive day, high radiation levels are detected in an area 30 kilometres (19 mi) northwest of the damaged Fukushima I nuclear plant at 150 μSv/h.
[ "NHK WORLD English". nhk.co.jp.] 

 In a 24-hour period ending at 11 am local time, radiation levels near the plant decline from 351.4 to 265 μSv/h.

Monday, 21 March 2011
Ongoing repair work is interrupted by a recurrence of grey smoke from the south-east side of unit 3 (the general area of the spent fuel pool) seen at 15:55 and is dying down by 17:55. Employees are evacuated from unit 3.
Officials learn that the crisis will not end with power recovery as the cooling pumps are damaged beyond repair and must be replaced. 

Tuesday, 22 March 2011
Smoke is still rising from units 2 and 3, but is less visible, and is theorized to be steam following operations to spray water onto the buildings. Repair work resumes, after having been halted because of concerns over the smoke.

Wednesday, 23 March 2011
Smoke again starts belching from reactor 3 in the late afternoon, this time black and grey smoke, causing another evacuation of workers from around the area. Aerial video from the plant shows what appears to be a small fire at the base of the smoke plumes in the heavily damaged reactor building. 

The Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary advises that high levels of radioactivity have been found in Tokyo's drinking water and that it should not be used to reconstitute baby formula as it is around twice the legal limit for children.
[Coren, Anna "Bottled water scarce after Japan's tap water shown unsafe for infants", CNN, 24 March 2011.]

Thursday, 24 March 2011
Three workers are exposed to high levels of radiation which cause two of them to require hospital treatment, after radioactive water seeps through their protective clothes.
 The workers are exposed to an estimated equivalent dose of 2–6 Sv to the skin below their ankles.
 They were not wearing protective boots, as their employing firm's safety manuals "did not assume a scenario in which its employees would carry out work standing in water at a nuclear power plant".
[http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/03/81122.html]

Friday, 25 March 2011
NISA announces a possible breach in the containment vessel of the unit 3 reactor.
Highly radioactive water is also found in the turbine buildings of units 1 and 2. The US Navy sends a barge with 1,890 cubic metres (500,000 US gal) of fresh water, expected to arrive after two days.

Saturday, 26 March 2011
Fresh water becomes available again for use instead of seawater to top up reactor water levels.
Radiation levels near the plant decline to a still high 170 μSv/h.

Sunday, 27 March 2011
Levels of "over 1000" and 750 mSv/h are reported from water within unit 2 (but outside the containment structure) and unit 3 respectively. A statement that this level in unit 2 is "ten million times the normal level" were later retracted and attributed to incorrectly high levels of iodine-134.

Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency indicate that "The level of radiation is greater than 1,000 millisieverts. It is certain that it comes from atomic fission ... But we are not sure how it came from the reactor."
 The high radiation levels cause delays for technicians working to restore the water cooling systems for the troubled reactors

An aerial video recorded by a Ground Self-Defense Force helicopter reveals, according to NHK, the clearest and most detailed view of the damaged plant to date. Significant observations include:
-White vapour, possibly steam, emanating from the buildings of reactors 2, 3, and 4.
-The roof of the reactor 2 building has been badly damaged but is still intact.

Monday, 28 March 2011
The Japanese Nuclear Safety Commission states that it "assumed" melted fuel rods in unit 2 have released radioactive substances into the coolant water, which subsequently leaked out through an unknown route to the unit 2 turbine building basement. 
The highly radioactive water halts work on restoring the cooling pumps and other powered systems to reactors 1–4.  

TEPCO confirms finding low levels of plutonium in five samples during 21 and 22 March.
Enriched levels of Plutonium-238, relative to Plutonium-239 and Plutonium-240, at two of the sites in the plant (solid waste area and field) indicate that contamination has occurred at those sites due to the "recent incident". 
[THEY WERE INDEED ENRICHING URANIUM AT DAIICHI.]

Tuesday, 29 March 2011
TEPCO "discovers" that radioactive runoff water is beginning to fill utility trenches outside the three reactor buildings. The highly radioactive water in and around the reactor buildings limits progress of the technicians in restoring the cooling and other automated systems to the reactors.

Wednesday, 30 March 2011
TEPCO Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata announces that it is unclear how the problems at the plant will be resolved. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finds radioactive iodine in milk in the United States.
[http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fgw-japan-radiation-milk-20110331,0,7944812.story] 

Friday, 1 April 2011
TEPCO says that groundwater near unit 1 contains radioiodine at levels 10,000 times normal, but NISA later disputes the numbers.
["Iodine 131 found in groundwater". The Japan Times. 1 April 2011.]

[IS THIS A SORT OF "SHUT UP, STUPID, YOU AREN'T SUPPOSED TO SAY THAT!" DAMAGE CONTROL BY NISA?]

Saturday, 2 April 2011
TEPCO "observes for the first time" that contaminated water from the unit 2 is flowing into the sea.

Sunday, 3 April
The attempt to plug the leak near unit 2 fails when the concrete fails to set. 
Radioactive water continues to leak into the sea. 
TEPCO confirms the first deaths at the Fukushima facility, two workers who had been missing since 11 March and appear to have died in the basement of reactor 4 from bleeding due to multiple injuries inflicted by the tsunami.

Japanese government officials say the Daiichi plant may continue to release dangerous radiation into the air for several months.

Monday, 4 April 2011
TEPCO begins dumping water from storage tanks tainted with low levels of radioactivity into the Pacific Ocean on Monday night. Officials say this is needed to make room in a central waste facility to store water with a higher radioactive level. This more highly radioactive water is preventing workers from making progress on restoring the cooling and other systems to reactors 1–4.
Samples of seawater near the plant reveal radioactive caesium at 1.1 million times the legal limit.


[NOTE: BY JUST THE NEXT DAY, IODINE-131 HAD REACHED 7,5 N\MILLION TIMES THE LIMIT IN SEAWATER. Hall, Kenji and Makinen, Julie, "Los Angeles Times", 5 April 2011.]